Superstars and the Long Tail: The impact of technology on market structure in media industries by Weeds, Helen
ISSN 1755-5361 
                                University of Essex 
 
 
 
       Department of Economics 
 
 
 
  
      
        
 
 Discussion Paper Series 
 
    
   No. 669 June 2009 
    
 
Superstars and the Long Tail: The impact of 
technology on market structure in media industries 
 
Helen Weeds 
 
Note : The Discussion Papers in this series are prepared by members of the Department of 
Economics, University of Essex, for private circulation to interested readers. They often 
represent preliminary reports on work in progress and should therefore be neither quoted nor 
referred to in published work without the written consent of the author. 
Superstars and the Long Tail:
The impact of technology on market
structure in media industries
Helen Weeds, University of Essexy
29 June 2009
Abstract
Technological change is transforming media industries. Digitiza-
tion lowers the cost of recording, storage, reproduction and distribu-
tion, while computer-based editing facilitates higher quality and spe-
cial e¤ects. With electronic distribution, a vast range of content can
be made available to consumers at little cost. Meanwhile, the distrib-
ution of industry production and sales appears to be shifting: the late
20th century was the era of the hit parade, but in the 21st attention
has shifted to the long tail. This paper develops a free entry model
of di¤erentiated products with endogenous quality and heterogeneous
types to examine the implications of technological change for market
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structure, quality, and the distribution of rms in media industries.
This framework can be used to assess current and future trends in
media industries.
1 Introduction
Technological change is transforming media industries. In the production
of video content traditionally released as movies and TV programs and
recorded music, digitization lowers the costs of recording, storage and repro-
duction. Computer-based editing makes higher-quality production possible
at lower cost and facilitates new special e¤ects. Distribution on physical me-
dia has shifted to more compact, higher quality formats (from VHS to DVD;
from vinyl and tape to CD), while electronic distribution over cable and the
internet greatly reduces distribution costs. Digitization of television signals
permits many more channels to be shown for a given capacity (of radio spec-
trum or cable infrastructure), and allows images to be broadcast in higher
denition. On-line stores can stock a far wider range of products than local
retail outlets, and have developed personalized search and recommendation
services to assist consumers in nding content tailored to their individual
tastes.
These developments are profoundly altering the structure of media in-
dustries. The latter part of 20th century was the era of the hit parade:
as the best artists became available to all via recorded media (as compared
with live performance), consumer attention focused predominantly on a lim-
ited number of top movies, songs, and TV shows. The associated actors and
artists became superstarsand commanded high rents.1 Now the distribu-
tion within media industries appears to be shifting towards the long tail2:
a higher proportion of demand is represented by products that achieve few
1See Rosen (1981) for an economic analysis of superstars and the skewness of returns
in industries where talent of individual artists is important.
2As described by Anderson (2006).
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sales individually but which collectively constitute a large part of the market.
This fragmentation of demand threatens the prots of media companies, es-
pecially those (such as free-to-air television) relying on advertising revenues,
being directly related to audience size.
It is unclear how these trends will develop in the future. Will the distri-
butional shift from hits to the long tail continue, or might it be mitigated
by the strength of key brands? With technological changes that increase the
scope for raising product quality, what is the role of endogenous xed costs3
in this story? What is likely to happen to the distribution of rms, and to
the superstar phenomenon?
This research aims to investigate the impact of technological change on
media industries, in particular as it a¤ects market structure, product mix,
quality investment, and the size distribution of rms. To address these ques-
tions, we build a model of the media sector (which may be music, movies
or video content) capturing its essential features: a large set of di¤erentiated
products; xed costs which are often endogenous, increasing with quality;
di¤erences in talent or productivity; and the number of products deter-
mined by free entry. This model can be used to analyse the impact of cost
and demand changes on industry outcomes, and to explore underlying mech-
anisms, e.g. the role of endogenous xed costs. The aim of the research is
twofold: to investigate which underlying developments can explain past in-
dustry trends, and to assess the likely impact of ongoing and potential future
changes in technology.
As di¤erentiated product classes, media industries are typically modeled
using a locational model of product di¤erentiation.4 The Hotelling (1929)
model is used as the basis for modeling competition between TV broadcasters
by Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong and Weeds (2007), Peitz and
3See Sutton (1991).
4An alternative, representative consumer approach to product di¤erentiation is de-
veloped by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). This, however, is rarely used in models of media
industries.
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Valletti (2008) and Vogel (2009), among others. But this model takes the
number of rms to be xed (duopoly), making it unsuitable for a market
where the number of rms is determined by free entry. For this reason,
the Salop (1979) model is more appropriate to our purpose. In the Salop
model, however, quality is taken to be xed. The rst step in this paper is
to endogenize product quality, with a xed production cost that is increasing
in quality (à la Sutton (1991)). There is some modeling along these lines in
Armstrong and Weeds (2007), Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2009),
and Seabright and Weeds (2007). With endogenous quality, the Salop model
can be used to examine the impact of lower costs (xed and marginal), a
lower cost of raising product quality, and demand changes as captured by
the transportcost.
In representing rms as competing for customers around a circle, the
Salop (1979) model is unhelpful in two respects, however. First, the model is a
poor representation of reality in many di¤erentiated product markets. It may
be a reasonable approximation for spatial competition (say, between out-of-
town stores located around a city), but is less appropriate for heterogeneous
product classes such as media content where rms compete directly with
all rivals, not just two nearest neighbours. Secondly, the model becomes
intractable when rms are heterogeneous in anything other than locations:
if, for example, rms have di¤erent costs, the symmetry of the model is
forfeited and solutions become complex.
One of the motivations for this research is the question of how digiti-
zation a¤ects the relative outcomes for di¤erent artists or modes of pro-
duction. Rosens (1981) analysis of the economics of superstars derives the
distribution of outputs and returns from underlying talent di¤erentials and
cost functions.5 To capture this feature in the Salop framework we allow for
heterogenous rm talent, where a talented rm can raise its quality at rela-
5Rosen nds the shift from performance to recorded music, as recording costs fell, to
increase the skewness of returns: although there is greater entry by low-quality artists,
returns to the highest talent superstars increase enormously.
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tively low cost compared with an inferior rm. This di¤erence in productivity
may be either intrinsic (a talented individual may generate a quality that is
unattainable for lesser artists) or result from the chosen production method
(studio production facilitates higher quality than home video recording).
To incorporate heterogeneous rms, the Salop model is generalised so that
each rm competes directly with all others, not just its two nearest neigh-
bours. Salop-style models with symmetric competition have been developed
by Von Ungern-Sternberg (1991) and Chen and Riordan (2007); these mod-
els, or similar functional forms, are used by Brito (2003), Armstrong and
Wright (2008) and Germano (2008). In this paper we develop a framework
that allows for heterogenous rm types. The challenge is to nd a model
which is tractable under free entry, with a closed-form solution permitting
further (e.g. comparative static) analysis. The model can then be used to
examine the strategic choices of di¤erent rms and, with free entry of each
type, the mix and market shares of talented and untalented rms in industry
equilibrium.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes observed
trends and developments in media industries, specically movies and recorded
music. Section 3 discusses the modeling approach. Section 4 develops a
symmetric model of competition with free entry, initially with homogeneous
rms. This is extended to heterogeneous rms in section 5, where a rm
discovers its talent type after entry. In section 6 types are known before entry,
and the proportion of each in the industry is determined endogenously. With
endogenous entry and quality investment, a number of aspects of industry
structure can be examined. Section 7 discusses the ndings and concludes.
An appendix contains longer proofs.
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2 Industry trends and developments
This research is motivated by observed trends and on-going developments
in media industries. These are illustrated with reference to two industries:
movies and recorded music.
2.1 Movie production and distribution
Between the 1950s and 1970s, movie production for theater release su¤ered
greatly from the uptake of television, which reduced theater audiences to
a fraction of their pre-television size. In the US, adult per capita theater
admissions peaked at around 32 per annum in 1943 and fell to just four
per annum in 1971.6 The early movie industry essentially split in two, with
B-movies largely migrating to the television set in a shorter, episodic form,
while A-movies continued as primarily theatrical releases. Movie production
declined dramatically: output of the seven major Hollywood studios fell by
almost half, from an average of 278 new features per annum in 1950-54 to
147 per annum in 1970-74, with a low point of just 85 lms in 1977.
After the 1970s the demand for movies recovered substantially, boosted
by new, cheaper distribution channels: VHS followed by DVD formats, sub-
scription television,7 and video on demand (VoD). This era saw the rise of
the blockbuster movie, with huge expenditure on production and commensu-
rate salaries to top artists (star actors, and sometimes producers/directors).
The location of production also became more concentrated, with Hollywood
dominating big-budget movie output and worldwide cinema audiences.8
The internet is the next important development in movie distribution, as
high-speed broadband connections become widely available. Movie videos
6Figures from Waterman (2005), chapter 2.
7In the US, restrictions on pay TV were abolished in the late 1970s, clearing the way
for the growth of cable television.
8In Germany, France, and Italy the box o¢ ce share of American movies rose from
around 30% in the early 1970s to 50% or more in the mid 1990s. In 2001 the US accounted
for 44% of world box o¢ ce revenues.
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may be purchased from online stores or downloaded over faster connections.
These developments reduce distribution costs and make a wider range of titles
available to consumers. It is as yet an open question what the impact will
be on the structure of the movie industry. The limited evidence available
(see Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2008) for an analysis of US video sales)
indicates both a growth in the long tail (with the number of titles generating
just a few sales each week almost doubling) and the existence of a superstar
e¤ect (among the best-performing titles, a smaller number account for the
bulk of sales). However, it is unclear how these developments will progress
and what will be the impact on movie production and quality investment.
2.2 Recorded music
As in the movie industry, the music scene has historically been dominated by
a relatively limited number of stars and hit songs or albums (though tastes
and identities change over time). However, since 2000 a marked distributional
shift is taking place. There are fewer hit albums: the number of albums
achieving sales of 500,000 or more (i.e. gold, platinum, multi-platinum and
diamond) exceeded 1,000 in 2002, but fell by more than 40% to around
600 in 2005.9 Moreover, the top-selling albums no longer achieve such high
sales as they once did: in 2000, the top ve albums sold 38 million copies
combined; in 2005, the equivalent gure had almost halved to 19.7 million.
Of course, the music industry as a whole has su¤ered from the growth of
piracy, especially unauthorized le-sharing via the internet, but hits have
su¤ered disproportionately: for comparison, total sales in the music industry
fell by a quarter between 2001 and 2005.
Alongside the decline in hit albums, there has recently been a growth in
the long tail: products which achieve a small number of sales individu-
ally, but which collectively comprise a larger share of total sales than has
historically been the case. In other words, there has been a shift from hits to
9Figures from Anderson (2006), chapter 2.
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niches: demand is fragmenting into a multiplicity of sub-genres and a wider
set of bands. Bands and songs which used to be regarded as misses are
becoming increasingly important to industry producers and retailers.
Anderson (2006) highlights the role of internet distribution as the cause
of this shift. However, it is unclear why this latest innovation in distribution
method should have such an e¤ect. The advent of recorded music in the 20th
century an invention that made the output of individual artists available
to worldwide audiences had the opposite e¤ect, generating the superstar
or winner-take-allphenomenon described by Rosen (1981) and Frank and
Cook (1996). This suggests that a more subtle balance of cost and demand
changes might be responsible.
3 Modeling media industries
To address these questions, the media sector (whether this is music, movies,
or whatever else) must be modeled in a way that captures key industry fea-
tures, including the cost and demand conditions discussed in section 2. With
high xed and low marginal (per-unit) costs, and both horizontal and verti-
cal product di¤erentiation, media industries tend to be oligopolies. Industry
outcomes depend on equilibrium entry, investment (e.g. in quality), and
production decisions of competing rms.
In modeling media industries, the following features are important.
Horizontal di¤erentiation. Media content is a highly diverse product class:
movie genres include thrillers, comedies, and animation; musical genres in-
clude pop, jazz, and classical. Consumers are heterogeneous in their in-
dividual preferences, and most have a desire for variety. This entails the
desirability of producing a broad range of di¤erentiated products. Certain
characteristics of media content are important to particular groups of con-
sumers. For example, consumers tend to have a preference for the output of
their home country, reecting their own language, culture, icons, etc. In ad-
8
dition, some tastes may be narrowly focused (niches), while others appeal to
a broad swathe of consumers (e.g. lowest common denominatoroutput).
Fixed production costs. Content production costs are largely or entirely
xed: there is a large rst copy cost, while thereafter the marginal cost of
supplying additional viewers is negligible. This cost function implies that
price cannot equal marginal cost in the textbook sense. In conjunction with
consumer desire for variety, there is a trade-o¤ between the number of di¤er-
entiated products (which raises consumer surplus by matching diverse tastes
more closely) and duplication of xed production costs.
Quality and endogenous xed costs. While being xed in relation to the
number of viewers, production costs tend to increase with higher quality: a
movie, say, with greater appeal to viewers typically costs more to produce.
In other words, xed costs are partially endogenous, with important impli-
cations for market structure and competition (see Sutton (1991)).
Distribution costs. Distribution and retailing involve some per-unit costs
(pressing and delivering a CD or DVD; cinema viewing), but these are typ-
ically small compared with the cost of content production. The internet
lowers distribution costs in a number of ways. By dispensing with the need
for extensive retail oor space, more products can be stocked at lower cost.
Electronic distribution reduces the need for physical media to be transported
(e.g. downloading a song over a broadband connection rather than purchas-
ing a CD). Search costs may also be lower (see below).
Sunkness and uncertainty for producers. As well as being xed, produc-
tion costs are typically sunk: these cannot be recovered if the project is later
abandoned (although the possibility of movie sequels and staging of TV series
o¤er some exibility). In addition, success is highly uncertain: it is di¢ cult
to predict which outputs will be popular with consumers. These features
make investment risky, and may give rise to option values.
Talent of individual artists. Media content typically has a key input:
the artists, be they actors, musicians, or (sometimes) directors. Artists have
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intrinsic talent, which is largely exogenous but may also require development.
Di¤erences in their attractiveness to consumers, and their earning power, can
be huge: e.g. A-list / B-list actors; superstars, stars and also-rans.
Consumer uncertainty and search. For the consumer, media content is
an experience good: its valuation is uncertain until the product is consumed,
or at least sampled. The provision of product information and sampling op-
portunities is costly, for retailers, consumers, or both. In this environment
search and recommendation services are an important aspect of marketing
and retailing. Beyond word-of-mouth, consumers have long taken advan-
tage of sampling facilities o¤ered by retailers (traditional book and music
stores, cinema trailers) and the media (radio station play, newspaper and
magazine media reviews). Online recommendation services (such as Rhap-
sody for music) and individualized search are a more targeted and potentially
wide-ranging approach to this problem.10
This paper develops a modeling framework which captures both the entry
of horizontally di¤erentiated products and scope for vertical di¤erentiation
through quality investment. It incorporates xed costs, in particular en-
dogenous xed costs associated with higher quality, as well as distribution
costs. In the later sections it allows for talent di¤erences between rms,
which may reect either the intrinsic skill of the artists or di¤erent produc-
tion modes. The particular talent of the individual rm may be uncertain
prior to entry, being discovered only afterwards, or may be revealed prior to
entry. Through the development of three, related models, the paper examines
the implications of each of these features, determining equilibrium outcomes
for the number of rms (which may be interpreted as di¤erentiated prod-
ucts or brands), vertical di¤erentiation via quality investment, prices, and
the proportions and market shares of low-quality (basic) and high-quality
(premium) products.
10Search-based explanations for the long-tail phenomenon are examined by Brynjolfsson,
Hu and Simester (2007), among others.
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4 A model of competition with endogenous
quality
Each of N  2 rms is located at a corner of an N -dimensional polygon.
Each corner is connected to every other by a Hotelling line, the length of
which corresponds to the mass of consumers between the pair.11 The total
mass of consumers is normalised at 1, thus each pair of rms competes over
mass m = 2
N(N 1) . Unit transport cost is t. When rm k o¤ers utility uk to
consumers, rm is market share is given by
si =
1
N
+
(N   1)
2t
(ui   u i) (1)
where u i = 1N 1
P
j 6=i
uj.
Utility ui from consuming product i depends on product quality vi, ad-
vertising intensity ai, and price pi as follows
ui = vi   ai   pi: (2)
The parameter  represents the perceived nuisance of adverts. A rm that
supplies advertising a receives advertising revenue R(a) per viewer; we as-
sume that there are decreasing returns to supplying advertising, in the sense
that R is a concave function. A rm can choose its quality vi by incurring a
xed cost 1
2
v2i . There is a marginal cost c of supplying each customer.
Timing of the game is as follows. Firms rst choose whether or not to
enter the market; active rms and consumers locate as described above.12
11If the lines were instead taken to be of constant length, entry would not reduce average
transport costs. In this case a single rm would be socially optimal as entry merely
duplicates xed costs.
12The model structure implies that consumer locations are endogenous to the number
of rms that enter. Such an assumption may be justied by the marketing experience
that consumers have di¢ culty forming preferences over unknown products (or sets of
characteristics), and instead form preferences over the available set of products.
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Firms then compete for consumers, simultaneously setting quality v, adver-
tising a, and price p.
Firm is prot is given by
i =

1
N
+
(N   1)
2t
(ui   u i)

(pi   c+R(ai))  1
2
v2i :
Since pi = vi   ni   ui, we can write
i =

1
N
+
(N   1)
2t
(ui   u i)

(vi   ui   ni   c+R(ni))  1
2
v2i :
Regardless of market share it is a dominant strategy to set ai = a which
maximises R(a)  a. The corresponding revenue is denoted R.
Firm is best responses in p and v are
pi =
t
N (N   1) +
1
2
 
vi + p i   v i + c R

;
vi =
1
2t
(N   1) (pi   c+R) :
with p i and v i dened similarly as above. With N rms, equilibrium price
and quality are
pN =
2t
N (N   1) + c R
 and vN =
1
N
;
giving per-rm prot of
i =
1
N2

2t
(N   1)  
1
2

:
With free entry, (N) = 0 and the equilibrium number of rms is
N = 4t + 1; (3)
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and the free-entry price and quality are
p =
1
2 (4t + 1)
+ c R and v = 1
 (4t + 1)
: (4)
It can be seen from these results that distribution cost c and advertising
revenue R (which acts like a negative distribution cost) pass through in
full to consumer prices, and have no e¤ect on either the number of rms or
quality investment.
4.1 Social optimum
For comparison, we describe the socially optimal number of rms and the
quality per rm. Since the welfare e¤ects of advertising are additively sep-
arable from the welfare e¤ects of quality and diversity, we can ignore the
advertising side of the market.13 With N rms each providing a product of
quality v, social welfare is given by14
W = v   t
2N (N   1)  N

1
2
v2

: (5)
Given N , the optimal quality choice is 1
N
, the same as the market equilib-
rium. One can show that the welfare-maximizing number of rms is
NW = 1 + t +
p
t (1 + t) (6)
The market generates more (fewer) rms than is socially optimal for t >
(<)1
8
; note that competitive equilibrium (N  2) requires t  1
4
, which
entails excess entry.15 As  ! 1 (in the limit, quality is xed) the ratio
13The welfare e¤ects of advertising are contentious, and beyond the scope of this paper.
14With N rms, each is 2N(N 1) from its rivals, and so a consumer is on average
1
2N(N 1)
from her nearest product. The expected transport cost is then t2N(N 1) .
15The nding of excess entry is a common result in locational models of product di¤er-
entiation: see Bhaskar and To (2004).
13
N

NW
! 2, as in the Salop model.
4.2 Comparative statics
The model has three parameters of interest: distribution cost c, quality cost
 and transport cost t.
Proposition 1 Comparative static results for the endogenous quality model
are as follows.
(i) The equilibrium number of rms, N, is increasing in t and , and inde-
pendent of c. Similar comparative static results exist for the socially optimal
number of rms, NW .
(ii) Equilibrium price p is increasing in c, and decreasing in t and .
(iii) Equilibrium quality v is decreasing in t and , and independent of c.
Proofs are straightward and are omitted.
4.3 Impact of digitization
We wish to assess the impact of digitization. In this framework, digitiza-
tion may be characterised as some combination of the following e¤ects: (i) a
reduction in the per-unit distribution cost, c (digital formats, internet distrib-
ution); (ii) a reduction in the cost of raising quality,  (better special e¤ects,
multiple camera angles in sports coverage, speedier news reporting); and
(iii) a reduction in transport cost, t (viewer familiarization, lower adaptation
costs); this is equivalent to an expansion in market size (globalization).
From the comparative static results above, the following impacts can be
determined. A lower distribution cost c reduces prices, but has no other
e¤ects. A lower quality cost  reduces the equilibrium number of rms,
and raises both quality and price. This is an endogenous xed cost e¤ect:
with quality being cheaper at the margin, rms invest more and xed cost
increases. This reduces the equilibrium number of rms; in addition, price
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must be higher to recoup the higher xed cost. A reduction in transport
cost t (or, equivalently, market expansion) reduces the equilibrium number
of rms, and increases equilibrium quality and price. Lower t raises the
marginal return to quality, inducing rms to invest more, resulting in higher
quality and price, and larger endogenous xed costs. As t falls, competition
intensies; anticipating this, fewer rms enter.
5 Competition with heterogeneous rms
Now suppose that there are two distinct types of rms. In particular, rms
di¤er in the cost of raising quality, , with there being two types. Superior
rms have a low quality cost parameter L, while inferior ones have a higher
quality cost H > L. For simplicity we ignore advertising and its associated
revenue in the rest of the paper; as noted above, advertising revenue simply
feeds through to lower consumer prices.16
Firms do not know their own (or each others) types prior to entry (this
assumption is relaxed in the next section). Their common prior is a prob-
ability  of being type L and probability (1  ) of being type H. Firms
rst choose whether or not to enter; active rms and consumers locate as
described in section 4. After entry, rmstypes are revealed and they then
compete in quality v and price p.
One might expected the two types to choose di¤erent prices and quali-
ties; we denote these strategies fpL; vLg and fpH ; vHg for L- and H-types
respectively. With N active rms, a rm of type g expects to face  (N   1)
rivals of type L and (1  ) (N   1) rivals of type H.
The market share of rm i of type g is given by
sig =
1
N
+
(N   1)
2t
 
uig   ujL   (1  )ujH

: (7)
16Alternatively, distribution cost c could be thought of as net of advertising revenues.
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Its expected prot is
ig = s
i
g
 
pig   c
  1
2
g
 
vig
2
:
For given N; , equilibrium strategies are
vL =
1
N
(4tH  N + 1)
(4tHL   (N   1) )
;
pL = c+
2tL
(N   1)vL;
vH =
1
N
(4tL  N + 1)
(4tHL   (N   1) )
< vL;
pH = c+
2tH
(N   1)vH ;
where  = L + (1  ) H . Equilibrium prots for the two types are
L =
1
2
LvL

4t
N (N   1)   v

;
H =
1
2
HvH

4t
N (N   1)   v

:
where v = vL + (1  ) vH .
A rm does not know its type before entering the market. Given the prob-
abilities ; (1  ) of type L;H respectively, and substituting the equilibrium
outcomes above, expected prot is given by
E =
1
2N2 (N   1)
(4tL  N + 1) (4tH  N + 1)
4tHL   (N   1) (L + (1  ) H)
:
The free entry conditionE(N) = 0 has two roots, (4tL + 1) and (4tH + 1),
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and is discontinuous at

4tHL
1

+ 1

. Taking the smaller root17 the equi-
librium number of rms is
NA = (4tL + 1) (8)
and equilibrium prices and qualities are
vL =
1
L (4tL + 1)
; (9)
pL = c+
1
2L (4tL + 1)
; (10)
vH = 0; (11)
pH = c: (12)
In equilibrium, the two types of rm supply vertically di¤erentiated products.
Inferior (high quality cost) rms do not invest in quality at all and supply
the basic product at price equal to marginal cost, while superior (low quality
cost) rms supply higher quality products at a higher price.
5.1 Comparative statics
The model has ve parameters: distribution cost c, superior-type quality
cost L, inferior-type quality cost H , transport cost t and the proportion of
superior (L) types, .
Proposition 2 Endogenous quality model.
Comparative static results for the endogenous quality model are as follows.
(i) The equilibrium number of rms, NA, is increasing in t and L, and in-
dependent of c, H and .
(ii) Type Ls equilibrium price pL is increasing in c, decreasing in t, L and
17The prot function is monotonically decreasing for N 2

1;

4tHL
1
 + 1

, is pos-
itive at the lower bound of this interval and discontinuous at  1 at the upper bound,
thus the smaller root is the rst N at which prot reaches zero.
17
Table 1: Comparative statics in the model with heterogeneous firms
N pL pH vL vH
c none + + none none
γL + - none - none
γH none none none none none
t + - none - none
l none - none - none
, and independent of H .
(iii) Type Ls equilibrium quality vL is decreasing in t , L and , and inde-
pendent of c and H .
(iv) Type Hs equilibrium price pH is increasing in c, and independent of t,
H , L and .
(v) Type Hs equilibrium quality vH is independent of all parameters.
Proofs are straightward and are omitted. The results are summarized in
Table 1.
5.2 Impact of digitization
The impact of digitization is similar to that found in section 4, but with price
and quality e¤ects occurring for superior rms alone. A lower cost of raising
quality has no e¤ect on the choices of inferior rms, but reduces the equilib-
rium number of rms and raises both the quality and price of superior rms.
As before, these e¤ects are due to the endogeneity of xed costs. Globaliza-
tion, as captured by a reduction in transport cost, intensies competition and
increases the marginal return to quality, reducing the equilibrium number of
rms and increasing the quality and price of superior rms.
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6 The model with endogenous entry
Suppose there are two types of rm, untalented (U) and talented (T ). These
may represent di¤erent forms of content provision: low-budget home video
(such as that distributed on YouTube) and more expensive studio produc-
tion, which allows greater scope for quality enhancement. Or they might
represent alternative strategies chosen by ex ante identical rms: for exam-
ple, a broadcasters choice between basic and premium content, where the
quality of premium (but not basic) programming may be raised by additional
investment.
This model, unlike the previous two, incorporates exogenous xed costs as
well as a quality-related term.18 An untalented rm pays a xed cost F > 0
to supply a program of minimal quality v0, normalised at zero.19 It is unable
to raise quality further: since the model above with heterogeneous rms
shows that the inferior, high quality cost type does not invest anyway, this
assumption is not unduly restrictive. Talented rms have endogenous quality,
producing a program of quality v at a total (exogenous + endogenous) xed
cost of K + 1
2
v2. To ensure an equilibrium with both types, we require
K > F . For simplicity, we normalise the per-unit cost c  0: as demonstrated
by the two models above, a per-unit cost simply adds to prices and a¤ects
no other variables.
Move order in the game is as follows: First, rms discover their types
(or choose their production strategy); they then make entry decisions, before
competing in prices p and, for the talented type only, quality v.
A rm of type g anticipates that a proportion  of rivals will be of type
T and (1  ) of type U , with the total number of active rms being N > 1.
18These exogenous xed costs, and the di¤erence between them, are require to ensure
an equilibrium in which both types are present.
19Minimum quality v0 is assumed su¢ cient to ensure full consumer participation.
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Its market share is
sig =
1
N
+
(N   1)
2t
 
uig   ujT   (1  )ujU

:
For an untalented rm, prot is given by
iU =

1
N
+
(N   1)
2t
  piU +   pjT   vjT + (1  ) pjU piU   F ;
while a talented rm has prot
iT =

1
N
+
(N   1)
2t
 
viT   piT + 
 
pjT   vjT

+ (1  ) pjU

piT K 
1
2

 
viT
2
:
Each types prot function is concave in its price and, where relevant, quality,
thus second order conditions for a maximum are satised. Given N and ,
equilibrium prices for each type and equilibrium quality (for talented types
only) are given by
pU =
2t (4t  N + 1)
N (N   1) (4t   (N   1) (1  )) ;
pT =
8t2
N (N   1) (4t   (N   1) (1  )) > pU ;
vT =
4t
N (4t   (N   1) (1  )) :
Free entry conditions for each type (iU = 0 and 
i
T = 0) determine N
and . Taking the positive root for the latter, expressions for N and  are
given by
N =

4t
(K   F )
K
+ 1

; (13)
 =
F
(K   F )
 
K
(4t (K   F ) +K)
s
K
2 (K   F )F   1
!
: (14)
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It can be seen that as F ! 0 (with K > F ),  ! 0: talented types
are crowded out. As K ! F (with F > 0),  ! 1: untalented rms are
crowded out. To ensure an interior solution  2 [0; 1] the following parameter
restriction is required (with K > F the set is non-empty)
t 2
"
K
4 (K   F )
 
F
K
s
K
2 (K   F )F   1
!
;
K
4 (K   F )
 s
K
2 (K   F )F   1
!#
: (15)
Substituting (13) and (14), equilibrium prices and quality are given by
pU = F
s
K
2F (K   F ) ; (16)
pT = K
s
K
2F (K   F ) ; (17)
vT = 2 (K   F )
s
K
2F (K   F ) : (18)
Market shares for a single rm of each type are given by
sU =
r
2
F
K
(K   F ); (19)
sT =
r
2
K
F
(K   F ) > sU : (20)
The total share of talented rms, ST , is given by
ST = NsT =
K
(K   F )   (4t (K   F ) +K)
s
2F
K (K   F ) : (21)
Naturally, the total share of untalented types, SU = (1  )NsU = 1  ST .
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The next sub-section examines comparative static properties of these
equilibrium outcomes. As an additional exercise, we look at the impact
of a proportionate change in both xed costs, F and K. To assess this, we
redene F  f and K  k, where k > f . The equilibrium number and
mix of rms then become
N = 4t
k   f
k
+ 1;
 =
f
(k   f)
 
k
(4t (k   f) + k)
s
1

k
2f (k   f)   1
!
;
while equilibrium prices and quality become
pU = f
 s

k
2f (k   f)
!
;
pT = k
 s

k
2f (k   f)
!
;
vT = 2 (k   f)
 s

k
2f (k   f)
!
;
and market shares
sU =
r
2
f
k
(k   f);
sT =
s
2
k
f
(k   f);
ST =
k
(k   f)   (4t (k   f) + k)
s
2f
k (k   f) :
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6.1 Comparative statics
The model has ve parameters: untalented-type xed cost F , talented-type
xed cost K, talented-type quality cost , transport cost t and, allowing for
proportionate changes in xed costs, . The proportion of talented types,
, is now endogenous. The following propositions give comparative static
results for equilibrium outcomes of the endogenous quality model.
Proposition 3 Number of rms.
The equilibrium number of rms, N , is decreasing in F , increasing in K, 
and t, and independent of .
Proposition 4 Mix of talented and untalented types.
(i) The proportion of talented rms, , is decreasing in ,  and t.
(ii) Comparative statics in F and K are ambiguous; subject to the su¢ cient
condition
(4K2t   4F 2t +K2)
(4Kt   4Ft +K)2
s
K
2F (K   F ) > 1; (22)
 is increasing in F and decreasing in K.
Proposition 5 Prices and quality.
(i) Type Us equilibrium price pU is increasing in F and , decreasing in K
and , and independent of t.
(ii) Type Ts equilibrium price pT is increasing in , decreasing in  and
independent of t. It is decreasing (increasing) in F for F < (>)1
2
K, and
decreasing (increasing) in K for K < (>)3
2
F .
(iii) Type Ts equilibrium quality vT is decreasing in F and , increasing in
K and , and independent of t.
Proposition 6 Market shares.
(i) The market share of a single untalented rm, sU , is increasing inK,  and
, and independent of t. It is increasing (decreasing) in F for F < (>)1
2
K.
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Table 2: Comparative statics in the model with endogenous entry
N l pU pT vT sU sT SU ST
F - + (*) + - then + - + then - - ? ?
K + - (*) - - then + + + + ? ?
m none - + + + + + + -
γ + - - - - + + + -
t + - none none none none none + -
* subject to sufficient condition.
(ii) The market share of a single talented rm, sT , is decreasing in F , in-
creasing in K,  and , and independent of t.
(iii) The total market share of talented types, ST , is decreasing in ,  and
t. Comparative statics in F and K are ambiguous.
Proofs are given in the appendix. The results are summarized in Table 2.
6.2 Impact of digitization
We wish to assess the impact of digitization. Digitization may be character-
ized as some combination of the following e¤ects:
 reduction in xed costs F and K, either individually, or together via 
(cheaper video storage, editing and transmission);
 reduction in the cost of raising quality  (better special e¤ects, multiple
camera angles in sports coverage, speedier news reporting);
 reduction in transport cost t (viewer familiarization; lower adaptation
costs; also market expansion due to globalization).
A reduction in xed cost for basicproduction F , on its own, increases
the total number of rms, as entry by untalented rms is encouraged. If
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the su¢ cient condition (22) is met, it can be determined that the proportion
of talented rms falls. Untalented rms cut their price, while talented types
respond to increased competition from untalented types by raising their qual-
ity, thus increasing vertical di¤erentiation. Talented rms rst reduce price,
but raise it again as F falls further, building their individual market shares
throughout.
A reduction in xed cost for premiumproductionK, on its own, reduces
the number of rms and results in lower per-rm market shares for both
types.20 If the su¢ cient condition (22) is satised, it can be determined that
the proportion of talented rms rises. Untalented rms raise price, while
talented rms invest less in quality, reducing vertical di¤erentiation, and
rst lower then (for further reductions in K) increase their prices.
More clear-cut results are found when both exogenous xed costs move
together. A proportionate reduction via a fall in  does not alter the total
number of rms but increases the proportion of talented types, which then
invest less in raising quality, reducing vertical di¤erentiation. With the in-
tensication of competition both types cut prices. Per-rm market share falls
for both types, but the total share of talented types increases.
A reduction in the cost of raising quality  reduces the total number of
rms but increases both the proportion and total market share of talented
types. Talented rms invest more in quality, increasing vertical di¤erentia-
tion. Prices charged by both types go up, while market per-rm shares for
both types decrease.
An increase in market size (globalization), as captured by a reduction
in transport cost t, reduces the total number of rms and increases both
the proportion and total market share of talented types. In this formulation
there is no change in quality or in prices of either type, nor in any individual
rms market share.
20Note that since the proportions of the two types, , also changes, these results are not
inconsistent.
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7 Discussion and conclusion
By examining and comparing the three models, the e¤ects of three develop-
ments linked to digitization can be assessed: cheaper quality, globalization,
and lower (exogenous) xed costs. Endogenous xed costs play a key role:
as described by Sutton (1991), various market developments a¤ect rmsin-
centive to invest in raising quality, increasing their (endogenous) xed costs
and altering the attractiveness of entry.
If quality becomes cheaper, rms invest more, inhibiting entry and raising
quality and price. With heterogeneous types, the second model illuminates
the scope for vertical (quality) di¤erentiation. Firms with a relatively high
quality cost do not invest in quality at all, preferring to produce basic prod-
ucts. Then, if quality becomes cheaper through digitization, the relatively
productive rms invest more and also raise their prices, increasing vertical
di¤erentiation and widening price dispersion.
Endogenizing entry of each type, the third model also allows the mix of
high- and low-quality products to change. If quality becomes cheaper, the
endogenous xed cost e¤ect reduces entry and increases vertical di¤erentia-
tion (as before), but also raises both the proportion and total market share
of high-quality products. Now, with lower entry of untalented rms, reduced
competition between basic products permits an increase in their price, as
well as in that of high-quality products, implying that price dispersion does
not necessarily increase.
Globalization raises the marginal return to quality, tending to induce
rms to invest more. With heterogenous rms basic products are left un-
changed, thus globalization increases vertical di¤erentiation and price dis-
persion. In all three models, the endogenous xed cost e¤ect of globalization
is so strong that number of rms actually falls, rather than rising as the mar-
ket expands. However, when product mix can change, rather than increasing
quality globalization instead raises both the proportion and total market
share of high-quality products. It would appear that the increased entry of,
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and competition between, talented rms o¤sets the increased marginal return
to quality resulting from globalization, leaving quality unchanged. However,
the high-quality products come to dominate the market as Hollywood did
in the global movie market in the latter part of the 20th century.
Changes in exogenous xed costs can be examined in the third model.
Whether xed cost reductions a¤ect low- or high-quality rms makes a cru-
cial di¤erence here. A reduction in the former increases the number of rms
(as in Salop (1979)), increasing the range of products available to consumers,
and may tend to increase the proportion of basic products (the long tail),
while also increasing vertical di¤erentiation as talented rms respond by rais-
ing quality. A lower exogenous xed cost for talented rms has the opposite
e¤ect, reducing the number of rms. This outcome appears to be the result of
increased competition between types rather than endogenous xed costs: tal-
ented rms lower the quality of their output, reducing vertical di¤erentiation
between these and basic products, which seems to inhibit entry overall. If
exogenous xed costs fall for both types proportionately, talented types gain
a larger total share of the market, but again vertical di¤erentiation falls. In
this case intensication of competition between the two types causes both to
cut prices.
Thus, with its various impacts, digitization may have a number of di¤er-
ent e¤ects. It is not inconsistent to nd basic products taking a larger share
of the market, even while more talented types increase their quality (this
may happen when the xed cost of making and distributing a low quality
product such as home video posted on YouTube falls). Such an outcome
increases the range of products available to consumers while also increasing
vertical di¤erentiation between low- and high-quality products. However,
other changes associated with digitization, such as lower-cost methods of im-
proving quality, increase vertical di¤erentiation but reduce entry, decreasing
the range of products on o¤er. The precise set of outcomes is sensitive to
the nature of the changes brought about by digitization, and may depend on
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which are the dominant factors. Thus, although explanations may be found
for observed trends, such as the rise of the hit parade in the late 20th century
and growth of the long tail in the 21st, drawing precise predictions for the
future is complex.
This paper has combined entry by horizontally di¤erentiated products,
vertical di¤erentiation and endogenous entry by di¤erent talent types.
Since the models are solving using free-entry conditions, rms (in expec-
tation at least) make no more than a normal return. Thus, although the
distribution of rms may be skewed, expected returns are not. A possible
extension would be to incorporate a complementary input, the artist, which
is in limited supply and must be combined with the endogenous quality in-
put (say, high-quality production or special e¤ects) to produce a song or
movie. A talented artist might then earn rents, akin to the skewed returns
in the superstars literature, which are a¤ected by the costs of other inputs
and demand changes. With this extension, the analysis might cast light on
the earnings of top artists and producers in the digital age.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
Number of rms, N = 4t (K F )
K
+ 1 = N = 4t (k f)
k
+ 1:
dN
dF
=  4t
K
< 0;
dN
dK
= 4t F
K2
> 0;
dN
d
= 0;
dN
d
= 4t (K F )
K
> 0;
dN
dt
= 4 (K F )
K
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 4.
Proportion of talented types,  = F
(K F )

K
(4t(K F )+K)
q
K
2(K F )F   1

=
f
(k f)

k
(4t(k f)+k)
q
k
2(k f)f   1

:
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d
dF
= K
(K F )2

(4K2t 4F 2t+K2)
(4Kt 4Ft+K)2
q
K
2F (K F )   1

+ K
2
4F (K F )3
(2F K)
(4Kt 4Ft+K)
q
2F (K F )
K
;
d
dK
=   F
(K F )2

(4K2t 4F 2t+K2)
(4Kt 4Ft+K)2
q
K
2F (K F )   1

  KF
4(K F )3
1
(4Kt 4Ft+K)
q
2F (K F )
K
;
The signs of d
dF
and d
dK
are ambiguous; a su¢ cient condition for d
dF
> 0 and
d
dK
< 0 is (
4K2t 4F 2t+K2)
(4Kt 4Ft+K)2
q
K
2F (K F ) > 1.
d
d
=   K2
42(K F )2(4t(K F )+K)
q
2F (K F )
K
< 0;
d
d
=  4t KF
(4Kt 4Ft+K)2
q
K
2F (K F )  142 1(4Kt 4Ft+K) K
2
(K F )2
q
2F (K F )
K
< 0;
d
dt
=  4KF 1
(4Kt 4Ft+K)2
q
K
2F (K F ) < 0:
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) Price of untalented type, pU =
q
FK
2(K F ) =
q
fk
2(k f) :
dpU
dF
= K
2
4(K F )2
q
2(K F )
FK
> 0;
dpU
dK
=   F 2
4(K F )2
q
2(K F )
FK
< 0;
dpU
d
= fk
4(k f)
q
2(k f)
fk
> 0;
dpU
d
=   KF
42(K F )
q
2(K F )
FK
< 0;
dpU
dt
= 0.
(ii) Price of talented type, pT =
q
K3
2(K F )F =
q
k3
2(k f)f :
dpT
dF
= (2F  K) K2
4F 2(K F )2
q
2F(K F )
K
< (>)0 for F < (>)1
2
K;
dpT
dK
= (2K   3F ) K2
4F (K F )2
q
2F (K F )
K
< (>)0 for K < (>)3
2
F ;
dpT
d
= k
3
4f(k f)
q
2f(k f)
k3
> 0;
dpT
d
=   K2
42F (K F )
q
2F (K F )
K
< 0;
dpT
dt
= 0.
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(iii) Quality of talented type, vT =
q
2K(K F )
F
=
q
2k(k f)
f
:
dvT
dF
=   K2
2F 2
q
2F
K(K F ) < 0;
dvT
dK
= (2K F )
2F
q
2F
K(K F ) > 0;
dvT
d
= k(k f)
2f
q
2f
k(k f) > 0;
dvT
d
=  K(K F )
22F
q
2F
K(K F ) < 0;
dvT
dt
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.
(i) Market share for a single, untalented rm, sU =
q
2 F
K
(K   F ) =q
2f
k
(k   f):
dsU
dF
= (K   2F )
q

2KF (K F ) > (<)0 for F < (>)
1
2
K;
dsU
dK
= F
K
q
F
2K(K F ) > 0;
dsU
d
= f(k f)
2k
q
2k
f(k f) > 0;
dsU
d
=
q
F (K F )
2K
> 0;
dsU
dt
= 0:
(ii) Market share for a single, talented rm, sT =
q
2K
F
(K   F ) =
q
2 k
f
(k   f):
dsT
dF
=  K
F
q
K
2F (K F ) < 0;
dsT
dK
= (2K   F )
q

2FK(K F ) > 0;
dsT
d
= k(k f)
2f
q
2f
(k2 fk) > 0;
dsT
d
=
q
K(K F )
2F
> 0;
dsT
dt
= 0:
(iii) Total shares of talented types, ST = K(K F ) (4t (K   F ) +K)
q
2F
K(K F ) =
k
(k f)   (4t (k   f) + k)
q
2f
k(k f) :
(NB: total share of untalented types, SU = 1  ST :)
dST
dF
= K
(K F )2 +

2t
K
(2F  K)  K
2(K F )
q
2K
F (K F ) ;
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dST
dK
= (4t (K   F ) +K) F (2K F )
2K2(K F )2
q
2K(K F )
F
  F
(K F )2 (4t + 1)
q
2F
K(K F ) ;
The signs of dST
dF
and dST
dK
are ambiguous.
dST
d
=   (4t (k   f) + k) f
2k(k f)
q
2k
2 fk
f
< 0;
dST
d
=  4t
q
2F (K F )
K
 
q
F
2K(K F ) (4t (K   F ) +K) < 0;
dST
dt
=  4 (K   F )
q
2F
K(K F ) < 0:
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